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Abstract
The problematization of asylum has detrimentally im-
pacted on the provision of support for asylum seekers in
host countries. The threat of destitution has become in-
strumental in restrictive asylum policies and is increas-
ingly used as a deterrent against asylum seeking. The EU
experience reveals acute tensions between the EU asylum
agenda and the EU Member States’ obligations under in-
ternational refugee and human rights law. The provision
of support for asylum seekers challenges narrow ap-
proaches to the realization of socio-economic rights for
“others” and to host countries’ duties in that respect. The
EU Reception Conditions Directive, which aims to set out
standards for the reception of asylum seekers across the
Union, exemplifies this predicament. Yet international
refugee and human rights law provides a legal framework
that establishes minimum standards critical to dignified
living for asylum seekers and the protection of the right to
seek refugee status in the EU and beyond.
Résumé
La problématique de l’asile a eu des répercussions nuisi-
bles sur la disposition de l’aide aux demandeurs d’asile
dans les pays d’accueil. La menace de la misère est deve-
nue une pierre de touche des politiques conjoncturelles
sur l’asile et elle sert de plus en plus d’élément dissuasif
pour contrer la demande d’asile. L’expérience de l’Union
européenne révèle des tensions aiguës entre le programme
d’asile de l’UE et les obligations des pays membres de
l’UE en regard des droits internationaux des réfugiés et
de la personne. La disposition sur l’aide aux demandeurs
d’asile remet en question les approches à court terme à
l’égard de la mise en œuvre des droits socio-économiques
pour les responsabilités des « étrangers » et des pays hô-
tes. Les directives sur les conditions d’accueil de l’UE, qui
visent à établir des normes pour l’accueil de demandeurs
d’asile partout dans l’Union, exemplifient cette difficile
situation. Malgré tout, les droits internationaux des réfu-
giés et de la personne fournissent un cadre qui fixe des
normes minimales de conditions de vie décentes pour les
demandeurs d’asile et la protection du droit de demander
un statut de réfugié dans l’UE et ailleurs.
Introduction
Actuellement des centaines de personnes venues chercher pro-
tection en France couchent dans la rue faute d’hébergement.
Des femmes, des hommes, des enfants qui ont dû quitter leur
pays où ils étaient persécutés ou risquaient de l’être sont con-
traints de vivre dans des conditions proches de la mendicité.1
T
his bleak picture is symptomatic of a deterioration of
the conditions of the reception of asylum seekers not
only in France, but across the European Union (EU).
The treatment of asylum seekers pending adjudication on
their application for refugee status reveals acute tensions
between the hostile agenda of the EU and its Member States
in the field of asylum and their humanitarian commitment
and obligations. Negative perceptions of asylum seekers that
foster myths and prejudice have polluted policy making and
normative reform in the area of asylum at both national and
European level. The threat of the “bogus” asylum seeker has
emerged as a pervasive and recurrent theme in the political
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rhetoric.2 Moreover, border control, immigration, and se-
curity concerns have become primary factors in the shaping
of the EU asylum policy.3 Asylum is increasingly perceived
as a migration-related matter closely connected with the
question of irregular migration.4 The current context leads
to a “quantitative approach” to asylum where “cutting down
the numbers” becomes a paramount objective and a yard-
stick for measuring the efficiency of asylum laws and poli-
cies, thus progressively eroding the humanitarian institution
of asylum. Portrayed as burdens for domestic economies as
well as potential threats to national security, asylum seekers
are becoming the EU “unwanted guests.”
The paper examines how scant provisions for support of
asylum seekers have become instrumental in restrictive
asylum policies across the EU. In other words, it considers
attempts  to use the  threat  of destitution as  a deterrent
against asylum seeking. The paper focuses on asylum seek-
ers, namely, persons who have applied for refugee status
within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).5
The reasons for this focus are twofold: first, the Refugee
Convention remains the cornerstone of refugee protection;
second, the Convention has come under sustained attacks,
making asylum seekers prime targets of harsher legislation
on State support.6 However, it is acknowledged that many
of the issues discussed in this paper are also relevant to other
categories of people in need of international protection.7
The paper adopts a human rights approach to support
for asylum seekers and looks at the question of socio-eco-
nomic rights for asylum seekers in the context of the EU.
For that purpose, the paper scrutinizes the international
legal framework and the Council Directive laying down
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers
(Reception Conditions Directive)8 which is now central to
the provision of support for asylum seekers in the EU. The
challenges faced by host States and asylum seekers in rela-
tion to reception are also considered.
Protecting the “Others” against Destitution: The
Question of Fundamental Socio-economic Rights
for Asylum Seekers
Few will dispute that a person in abject condition, deprived
of adequate means of subsistence, or denied the opportunity
to work, suffers a profound affront to his sense of dignity
and intrinsic worth. Economic and social arrangements can-
not therefore be excluded from a consideration on the de-
mands of dignity. At the least, it requires recognition of a
minimal concept of distributive justice that would require
satisfaction of the essential needs of everyone.9
Respect for human dignity supposes the fulfillment of
basic socio-economic rights. Many of these rights may be
described as droits créances, the implementation of which
requires positive action on the part of the State and the
mobilization of considerable State resources.
Socio-economic rights aim to provide a base of material
security, inherent in human dignity, below which citizens
shall not fall.10 The use of the word “citizen” is not neutral.
Indeed, the realization of socio-economic rights for non-
nationals is mediated by significant political, economic,
and social factors. The conferment of socio-economic
rights on non-nationals, namely “non-citizens,” necessi-
tates an approach to the welfare State based on greater social
and economic solidarity.11
In that respect, two contradictory trends tend to dominate
legislative debates and interventions: the need to achieve greater
equality between nationals and non-nationals and the need to
respond to social tensions, especially in times of economic
recession when foreign migrants are perceived as a threat to the
domestic workforce. Whilst the first trend supports the adop-
tion of non-discriminatory laws and policies, the second results
in stringent measures that are likely to contribute to the impov-
erishment of migrants.12
The question of basic socio-economic rights for asylum
seekers is nested within wider debates on asylum and mi-
gration control as well as general discussions on the future
of welfare provision. Whilst the latter are concerned with
the pressures faced by the welfare State as a result of “eco-
nomic globalisation, budgetary deficits, demographic
change, as well as the effects of neo-liberal thinking on
welfare provision,”13 the former focuses on the pres-
sures—perceived or actual—stemming from forced and
voluntary migration. Both types of pressure have significant
implications for those seeking refugee status in the EU,
including for their access to welfare provisions pending a
final decision on their application for refugee status. The
polarized dynamic that opposes citizens to non-citizens,
“us” to “others,” with respect to socio-economic rights is
duplicated at EU level with its self-centred approach, which
primarily seeks the entitlement of EU citizens. Whilst there
is progress with regard to the rights and status of third-
country nationals who are permanent residents in the EU,14
the EU asylum and immigration  policies show  a  trend
towards the exclusion of other categories of non-EU citi-
zens.
The dilemma of asylum seekers lies with their great vul-
nerability and high dependence on host States as well as the
temporary and uncertain nature of their status. Restrictive
asylum laws and policies exacerbate this vulnerability inher-
ent in the condition of asylum seeker. In spite of their evident
need for State support, the realization of socio-economic
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rights for asylum seekers in host countries remains the object
of heated debates. Because they do not contribute to the
economy in general and to the welfare system in particular,
asylum seekers are too often perceived and portrayed as
undeserving recipients of State benefits and assistance.15 Such
views rest upon mistaken assumptions and prejudice against
asylum seekers. No one can contest that asylum seekers are
in great need of State support. And if the assertion that they
benefit from rather than contribute to the host State welfare
system is indeed correct, the latter statement must be put into
context to avoid simplistic and erroneous conclusions. The
reasons for asylum seekers’ need for State support are en-
trenched in their very circumstances which make them one
of the most vulnerable populations worldwide. Paradoxi-
cally, host States aggravate asylum seekers’ dependence by
preventing, limiting, or unnecessarily delaying their access to
employment. Yet, as observed by UNHCR, “many asylum-
seekers are capable of attaining a certain degree of self-reli-
ance if provided with an opportunity to do so.”16 This issue
is examined later in the paper.
The Challenges Faced by Host States and Asylum
Seekers
The most significant challenges faced by the EU Mem-
ber States as host States relate to the costs associated with
the reception of asylum seekers and the logistics of such
reception. A further difficulty arises from anti-refugee
sentiment which may be rife in host countries and encour-
aged by governments. Indeed, many governments bear
much responsibility in perpetrating myths about asylum
seekers and fostering prejudice. The growing politiciza-
tion of asylum in the EU has exacerbated this trend to the
detriment of asylum seekers’ rights. Alarmist discourses
on asylum abuse are indicative of this development.17
While it is accepted that abuses of asylum systems take
place, the “threats” posed by so-called “bogus” asylum
seekers—as opposed to “genuine” asylum seekers—have
been exaggerated with a view to justifying stricter policies
and legislation.18 The concept of “bogus” asylum seeker
remains extremely vague as it is often ascribed prior to the
substantive examination of asylum claims. The challenge
for the EU Member States is to receive asylum seekers in
dignified conditions whilst addressing the problem of
misuse of asylum channels.19 The latter, however, should
not be used as a pretext to legitimize a deterioration of
reception conditions in the EU. A further difficulty lies
with the fact that the provision of State assistance for
asylum seekers is often “set against competing national
priorities for limited resources.”20 While the role of chari-
ties  and  NGOs in  the provision  of support to  asylum
seekers must not be underestimated, these organizations
cannot offer a viable substitute for deficient State assis-
tance.21 The ability of charities to address the demand for
support was questioned in the UK High Court.22 Research
carried out by the UK Refugee Council revealed that 85
per cent of respondents (132 charitable organizations) did
not have funding to cover the cost of the services they
provided to asylum seekers denied support under English
law.23 The challenge for the EU is therefore to reconcile its
asylum  agenda with the  Member States’ humanitarian
duties and obligations, whilst addressing the economic
and  practical difficulties  arising from  the  reception of
asylum seekers. In that respect, two observations may be
made. First, without undermining the economic implica-
tions of support for asylum seekers, one must stress the
fact that the EU Member States are amongst the wealthiest
nations in the world and that the scale of the problems
they experience as host countries cannot compare with
the magnitude of those faced by much poorer host coun-
tries. Secondly, the EU as a whole must account for the
economic disparities that exist within the enlarged Union
and ensure that the States which have recently joined the
EU are able to provide adequate reception conditions.24
As already observed, many asylum seekers are destitute
upon arrival in host countries. They are, therefore, depend-
ent on host countries for their essential living needs such as
accommodation, food, clothing, and health care. “Unsym-
pathetic” asylum laws and policies in the EU have impacted
upon the extent and modalities of State assistance for asy-
lum seekers. There is a perception amongst EU Member
State Governments that generous provisions of support
render them “too” attractive to asylum seekers.25 Further
difficulties stem from the complexities associated with ac-
cess to support by asylum seekers in host States. Effective
access supposes that asylum seekers are made aware of their
rights. Hence, the existence of and access to adequate infor-
mation is the necessary corollary to efficient support pro-
vision. Restrictive approaches to reception conditions
make prompt and comprehensive information even more
vital as exemplified by UK legislation. Indeed, Section 55 of
the much criticized Nationality, Immigration and Asylum
Act 2002 (NIA Act 2002) stipulates that the Secretary of
State for the Home Department (Secretary of State) and
local authorities may refuse support where the former is not
satisfied that “the claim was made as soon as reasonably
practicable after the person’s arrival in the UK.”26 Section
55 was the object of much controversy and litigation.27
From the day it entered into force, the words “as soon as
reasonably practicable” were interpreted as meaning “im-
mediately on arrival.”28 The deterrent nature and purpose
of Section 55 were made obvious in a statement of Beverley
Hughes, the then Immigration Minister:
The Threat of Destitution as a Deterrent against Asylum Seeking in the European Union
83
It is a reasonable expectation that desperate people fleeing for
their lives will claim asylum as soon as they can and we will
continue to support these people in the same way we do now.
However, we are determined to tackle abuse and these measures
send a clear signal across the world that the asylum system must
be used for its proper purpose. It is not acceptable for people to
claim asylum after being in the UK for weeks or months work-
ing illegally, simply as a way of staying on at the taxpayer’s
expense and delaying removal.29
The fact that asylum seekers may need specialized care
and that some groups are particularly vulnerable render
eligibility for and access to adequate support even more
critical to dignified living in host countries, whilst present-
ing the latter with additional challenges and obligations. As
stressed by UNHCR, there are groups of asylum seekers
with special needs; this is the case of female asylum seekers,
children seeking asylum, and elderly asylum seekers.30
These persons are particularly vulnerable when they are not
accompanied by family members.
The question of reception conditions for asylum seekers
poses challenges for both providers and recipients. A bal-
ance that accommodates asylum seekers’ needs while ac-
counting for host countries’ resource capacity must be
found. In the current context, however, the problematiza-
tion of asylum has led to a deterioration of asylum seekers’
standard of living in the EU Member States. Governments
present stringent provisions on support as key tools in their
fight against abuses of asylum procedures, thereby justify-
ing and legitimizing such provisions. These harsh meas-
ures, however, serve  a much wider agenda, namely  the
reduction of the numbers of asylum claims lodged within
the EU Member States and at their borders. This quantita-
tive and thus restrictive approach to asylum detrimentally
impacts on the level of support available to asylum seekers.
Support for asylum seekers, however, cannot be reduced to
a humanitarian exercise depending on EU Member States’
“generosity” and discretion. Indeed, international refugee
law and international human rights law in particular pro-
vide a binding legal framework which sets out minimum
standards applicable to the reception conditions of asylum
seekers in the EU.
The International Legal Framework
The Refugee Convention is silent on the question of recep-
tion conditions for asylum seekers. It remains, however, that
the right to seek refugee status that may be inferred from
Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention cannot be fully
realized in the absence of dignified living standards for those
exercising the right in question.31 International human
rights law plays a fundamental complementary role in de-
fining minimum standards for the reception of asylum seek-
ers. Indeed, the obligations arising from international hu-
man rights  law  are  relevant to the  treatment of  asylum
seekers and impose constraints on EU and Member State
legislation. The provision of support for asylum seekers in
the Union, however, shows dissension between the Member
State Governments’ perceived discretion and their obliga-
tions under international human rights law. This is sympto-
matic of wider tensions between the restrictive agenda of the
EU and its Member States and international refugee and
human rights law.
The minimum core of human rights applies to everyone in all
situations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural rights (ICESCR) recognize the right to all indi-
viduals to an adequate standard of living, which includes the
provision of food, clothing and accommodation ( . . . ).32
Moreover both instruments protect the right to health
care33 as well as the right to education which is particularly
relevant to children asylum seekers.34 The Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)35 and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC)36 provide additional protection to particu-
larly vulnerable groups of asylum seekers, namely, female
and minor asylum seekers. However, three main factors
mediate the extent to which these international instruments
can contribute to shaping EU and Member States’ legisla-
tion on the reception of asylum seekers and impose mini-
mum standards in that respect. The first factor, namely the
lack of binding effect, is specific to the UDHR. The second
factor relates to the ICESCR and its mode of implementa-
tion, i.e. the progressive realization of the rights recognized
in the Covenant to the “maximum of [the States’] available
resources.”37 The third factor is connected with the imple-
mentation and enforcement weaknesses that characterize
the international legal order.
The absence of effective supervisory mechanisms means that
sanctions for States’ failures to comply with international law
are often of limited effect. In the international legal order, the
State very much remains the ‘champion’ of individual rights. In
practice, this means that where a State is unwilling or unable to
perform [its] obligations, the individuals who fall within its
jurisdiction will [often] be deprived of the benefit of the rights
conferred by international law ( . . . ).38
A human right central to the protection of asylum seek-
ers is the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and de-
grading treatment or punishment. This fundamental right
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is enshrined in a  number  of  international  instruments,
including the UDHR39 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).40 The prohibition in
question is also incorporated in the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR).41 This Convention, which is binding on all EU
Member States, is crucial to the protection of human rights
in Europe. Article 1 of the ECHR provides that “[t]he High
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of
this Convention.” Consequently, the benefit of the ECHR
provisions extends to asylum seekers who find themselves
within the jurisdiction of the EU Member States. The rele-
vance of the ECHR, and of Article 3 in particular, to the
reception standards applicable to asylum seekers was
evinced in the case law on Section 55 of the NIA Act 2002.42
As already noted, Section 55(1) permits the UK Secretary
of State and local authorities to refuse support where the
Secretary of State is not satisfied that “the claim was made
as soon as reasonably practicable after the person’s arrival
in the United Kingdom.” Section 55, which was inserted as
a very late amendment in the Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Bill, aims to ensure that people apply for asylum as
soon as possible. Lord Filkin observed: “There is clearly an
issue about whether people should be supported by the
state while they make an asylum claim which, on all the
evidence, appears to be substantially late.”43 As mentioned
above, the UK Government was prompt to adopt a harsh
approach and read the words “as soon as reasonably prac-
ticable” as meaning “immediately on arrival.”44 “A signifi-
cant number of single asylum seekers and couples without
children [45] were deprived of support and, as a result, a
high profile and successful challenge to refusal of support
was lodged, claiming breaches of the ECHR: R. (Q and
others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment[46][R.(Q and others)].”47
Section 55 of the NIA Act 2002 turned the question of
support for asylum seekers in the UK into a battleground
between the judiciary and the executive. In R. (Q and
others), the Home Secretary sought to challenge the judg-
ment of Collins J. in the High Court.48 Collins J. held that
Section 55 contravened Article 3 of the ECHR.49 Article 3
reads that: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” On
March 18, 2003, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment
of Collins J. Firstly, the Court of Appeal recalled that the
concept of treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the
ECHR required a positive action on the part of the State.50
The Court found that the fact that asylum seekers were
prohibited from working51 together with the fact that they
were no longer entitled to support if destitute amounted to
positive action on the part of the UK Government.52 Sec-
ondly, the Court of Appeal observed that the level of deg-
radation necessary to breach Article 3 fell “significantly
below” the definition of destitution contained in the Immi-
gration and Asylum Act 1999.53 To be found “destitute”
under the Act, an asylum seeker must have been or must be
unable to obtain adequate accommodation, food, and other
essential items.54 In Pretty v. UK, the European Court of
Human Rights provided guidance as to the level of suffer-
ing, physical or mental, required to engage Article 3.55 The
Court held:
As regards the types of ‘treatment’ which fall within the scope
of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court’s case law refers to
‘ill-treatment’ that attains a minimum level of severity and
involves actual bodily injury  or  intense physical  or  mental
suffering. Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual
showing lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human
dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable
of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may
be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibi-
tion of Article 3. The suffering which flows from naturally
occurring illness, physical or mental, may be covered by Article
3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether
flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other meas-
ures, for which the authorities can be held responsible.56
In the High Court, Collins J. took the view that “ (. . .)
unless other means of support are available when support
is withdrawn, there will be a breach of Article 3 [of the
ECHR].”57 The Court of Appeal, however, adopted a nar-
rower approach to breaches of Article 3 and ruled that the
mere fact that there was a “real risk” that asylum seekers’
conditions could “verge on” the degree of severity described
in Pretty was not in itself sufficient to trigger a breach of
Article 3 of the ECHR.58 In contrast with Collins J., the
Court of Appeal held that it was not unlawful for the
Secretary of State to decline support “unless and until” it
was clear that charitable support was not available and that
the asylum seeker could not fend for himself or herself,59
the burden of proof being on the asylum seeker.60 In the
absence  of other sources of support, however, a State’s
refusal to provide support could amount to treatment con-
trary to Article 3 of the ECHR where the asylum seeker’s
condition is so severe as to meet the threshold set out in
Pretty.61
Compliance with Articles 8(1) (right to respect for pri-
vate and family life) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the ECHR
was also considered in R. (Q and others). Collins J. took the
view that Section 55 entailed a “real risk” to leave asylum
seekers destitute in breach of both Articles 3 and 8(1) as
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“[he was] not persuaded that charity offer[ed] a real chance
of providing support.”62 It follows from the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights that, whilst not every act
or measure which adversely affects moral or physical integ-
rity will interfere with the rights protected in Article 8(1),
treatment which does not reach the degree of severity re-
quired under Article 3 can nonetheless infringe Article
8(1).63 The Court of Appeal, however, did not think it
necessary to consider Article 8(1) because it “add[ed] lit-
tle.”64 Moreover, on the facts of the case, it was “easier [to]
envisage the risk of infringement of Article 3 rights rather
than of article 8 rights.”65 “That said, [the Court of Appeal]
accepted that if the denial of support impacted sufficiently
on the asylum seeker’s private and family life, including on
his or her physical or mental integrity and autonomy, there
would be a breach of Art. 8(1) (unless justified under Art.
8(2)[66].”67 Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal
went on to consider Article 6 of the ECHR. The Court of
Appeal agreed with Collins J. who found that the process as
a whole did not satisfy the requirements of Article 6.68 The
Court of Appeal concluded that the system for assessing
asylum seekers’ eligibility for support under Section 55 was
unfair and the assessment process flawed.69 Following the
decision of the Court of Appeal, the Home Secretary indi-
cated that the procedural flows identified by the courts
would be rectified. Still decisions made by the Secretary of
State under Section 55 continued to be challenged. The
grounds of challenge concerned the timing of the applica-
tions for support and alleged breaches of Article 3 of the
ECHR. With regard to the first point, Maurice Kay J. found
that the conclusion reached by the Secretary of State was
justified in two cases out of three. Whilst the Home Secre-
tary’s decisions were justifiable in the case of “S” and “T”,
the decision process was deemed unfair and lacking ration-
ality in the case of “D”.70 Turning to the human rights
aspects, Maurice Kay J. found that Article 3 of the ECHR
had been engaged in all three cases.
All three applicants were in a very distressed state: “S” was
forced to beg for food, and suffered from psychological distur-
bance and significant weight loss; “D” had also begged for food,
was sleeping rough, and felt hungry, frightened and depressed;
“T” had lived at Heathrow, where he found it difficult to sleep
due to noise and light and was unable to bathe or wash his
clothes; he developed a cough and a problem with one eye, and
began to feel increasingly demoralised and humiliated.71
On May 21, 2004, the Court of Appeal dismissed three
appeals lodged by the Home Secretary against rulings in the
High Court and agreed with the latter that Article 3 of the
ECHR had been violated in the case of three destitute
asylum seekers.72 Although the UK Government declared
that it would yet again revise the way Section 55 was imple-
mented so that it would operate more humanely, it pointed
out that it would consider challenging the ruling of the
Court of Appeal in the House of Lords. The UK Refugee
Council’s Executive, Maeve Sherlock, warned against this:
We welcome the decision to change how this policy, known as
Section 55, operates. The Court of Appeal ruling found the
policy of denying food and shelter to asylum seekers was unlaw-
ful, as they would have no other means of support. Fighting that
ruling through higher courts is bound to be costly and long
drawn out. We urge ministers not to pursue that course, but
instead follow the logic of this change of approach, which will
ensure asylum seekers have the basic essentials with which to
live.
There is clear evidence that Section 55 is causing widespread
misery and destitution among people who have fled persecution
in their own countries and deserve protection here. It is admin-
istratively cumbersome, which wastes valuable Home Office
time that could be better spent on making high quality asylum
decisions.73
It is believed that the question of support for asylum
seekers under Section 55 of the NIA Act 2002 will continue
to be a source of tensions between the UK judiciary and the
UK Government and reveal inconsistencies between do-
mestic provisions and human rights standards.
A further instrument to consider is the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the EU (EU Charter).74 In addition to
the right to asylum,75 the EU Charter protects a number of
rights that may contribute to improving the reception con-
ditions of asylum seekers across the EU. These include the
right to social security and social assistance,76 access to
preventive health care and medical treatment,77 educa-
tion,78 and the right of children to “such protection and care
as is necessary for their well-being.”79 For the time being,
the lack of binding effect of the EU Charter constricts the
influence it may have in shaping EU policy and legislation
on asylum. Yet, as noted by Rogers, the EU Charter has been
“taking hold in certain quarters by stealth, winning friends
and influencing people. It is gathering a momentum of its
own, not just in academic circles,” and “[i]ts practical
effects both actual and potential, can no longer be ig-
nored.”80 This is certainly the case in the field of asylum
where “[n]ot only does it reinforces the rights-based nature
of asylum and migration law, but it also provides a useful
interpretative force.”81 Importantly, the EU Constitution,
signed on October 29, 2004, renders the EU charter bind-
ing.82
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International human rights law provides a legal frame-
work within which reception standards for asylum seekers
must be defined. However, as exemplified by the UK expe-
rience, compliance with human rights obligations has be-
come problematic in the context of restrictive asylum laws
and policies. At the time when the EU is moving towards a
common European asylum system, it is imperative that
international standards are endorsed by the EU and its
Member States if the right to seek refugee status is to be
safeguarded in the Union.
The Reception Conditions Directive
At the Tampere European Council of October 15 and 16,
1999, the EU Member States agreed to establish a set of
common basic rules and principles establishing a common
European asylum system against the background of a com-
mon asylum and immigration policy.83
This system should include, in the short term, a clear and
workable determination of the State responsible for the exami-
nation of an asylum application, common standards for a fair
and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum conditions
for the reception of asylum seekers,84 and the approximation of
rules on the recognition and content of refugee status ( . . . ).85
On January 27, 2003, the Council of the EU adopted the
Directive laying down minimum standards for the recep-
tion of asylum seekers (Reception Conditions Directive).86
The Reception Conditions Directive was the outcome of a
polarized and heated debate where the need to ensure
respect for human dignity was balanced against the overall
restrictive objectives of the EU asylum policy as well as
financial considerations. Whilst concern for fundamental
human rights encouraged the adoption of more generous
standards protective of human dignity, the drive towards
reducing asylum seeking in the Union called for the level-
ling down of these standards. It was unavoidable that these
tensions would impact on the Directive provisions. The
Reception Conditions Directive gives the Member States
considerable latitude with respect to its implementation.87
Whilst UNHCR welcomed the Directive as “an important
step in bringing greater coherence to asylum policy in the
European Union,” it regretted the overall lack of harmoni-
zation and “would like to have seen more safeguards in
certain areas.”88
Because of the tensions and discord that marked the
drafting and decision-making process, the Reception Con-
ditions Directive was unable to reflect best practice.89 Not-
withstanding the existence of constraints arising from
international refugee and human rights law,  the policy
objectives of  the EU in  the field of  asylum shaped  the
Directive and supported lower reception standards. In the
opinion of many Member States, the adoption of more
generous provisions carried the risk of encouraging asylum
seeking in the EU, thus defeating the policy objective of
deterrence.90 One could attempt to argue that the possibil-
ity offered to Member States to retain or introduce more
favourable provisions91 renders the adoption of lower
standards more acceptable. This line of reasoning, however,
cannot be reconciled with the Member States’ perception
that more liberal domestic provisions will make them more
“attractive” to asylum seekers.92 This belief will dissuade
many Member States  from  maintaining more generous
domestic laws and practices. Consequently the minimum
standards set out in the Directive are likely to become the
standards common to the Member States.
Compliance with international refugee and human
rights law required the adoption of standards conducive to
dignified living conditions for asylum seekers in the EU.
However, the compromises needed to overcome Member
States’ divergences together with conflicting human rights
and policy objectives led to the watering down of the Com-
mission’s original Proposal for a Reception Conditions
Directive.93 While there are positive aspects to the Direc-
tive, it is apparent from its provisions that lowest national
standards are likely to become the norm throughout the
EU. The perceived impact of disparities in national laws and
practices on asylum seekers’ primary and secondary move-
ments within the EU may prompt Member States with
more liberal provisions to lower their standards. It is argued
that the Directive does not provide sufficient safeguards
against the temptation to use the threat of destitution as a
deterrent tool in the EU Member States. The prevalence of
restrictive asylum policy objectives over human rights con-
siderations appears at odds with the EU’s proclaimed com-
mitment to the protection of human rights that culminated
with the adoption of its own Charter of Fundamental Rights
(the EU Charter),94 thus revealing a certain degree of
“schizophrenia” on the part of the EU and its Member
States.
The Reception Conditions Directive applies to applica-
tions for refugee status lodged within a Member State or at
its borders95 until a final decision is taken.96 Asylum seekers’
family members are also entitled under the Directive pro-
visions.97 However, the Council of the EU refused to depart
from the western concept of nuclear family and confined
the scope of the Directive to the spouse or unmarried
partner of the asylum seeker and the minor children of the
applicant or the couple so long as they are unmarried and
dependent.98 This narrow definition of the term “family
member” goes against the recommendation of UNHCR,
which advocates a more inclusive approach.99 The Recep-
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tion Conditions Directive makes provision for groups with
special needs. These include “minors, unaccompanied mi-
nors, disabled people, pregnant women, single parents with
minor children and persons who have been subjected to
torture, rape or other serious psychological, physical or
sexual violence.”100 Moreover, the wording of the Directive
suggests that this is not an exhaustive list.101
Asylum seekers’ eligibility for State support under the
Directive may be subject to a condition of resource. Article
13(3) stipulates that: “Member States may make provision
of all or some of the material reception conditions and
health care subject to the condition that applicants do not
have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate
for their health and to enable their subsistence.”102 The
wording of the Directive leaves great discretion to the Mem-
ber States. Indeed, the latter may decide that State support
shall be means tested in part or in its entirety103 and require
that asylum seekers contribute to the cost of their material
reception conditions and health care when they have “suf-
ficient resources.”104 Significantly, the Directive leaves to
the Member States the task of defining the key notion of
“sufficient resources.” The loose wording of the Directive
is therefore open to stringent national interpretations that
may detrimentally impact on the level of support for asylum
seekers across the EU.
Another source of concern arises from the Directive
provisions on reduction and withdrawal of State support.
The first set of circumstances covers situations where the
asylum seeker
abandons the place of residence determined by the competent
authority without informing it or, if requested, without permis-
sion, or does not comply with reporting duties or with requests
to provide information or to appear for personal interviews
concerning the asylum procedure during a reasonable period
laid down in national law, or has already lodged an application
in the same Member State.105
Member States are under the obligation to resume sup-
port in relation to those applicants who have been traced
or have voluntarily reported to the competent authority.106
This safeguard, however, is undermined by Member States’
discretion to reinstall reception conditions fully or par-
tially.107 A particular cause for concern lies with the Mem-
ber States’ possibility of refusing support where an asylum
seeker is deemed to have “sufficient resources”108 or “where
[he or she] has failed to demonstrate that the asylum claim
was made as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival in
that Member State.”109 The latter provision was inserted at
the request of the UK Government, which had decided to
introduce tougher national legislation on support for asy-
lum seekers, and may prove highly contentious as exempli-
fied by the UK experience.110 Indeed, this provision echoes
Section 55 of the NIA Act 2002.111 The Directive provides
for general safeguards and requires decisions for the reduc-
tion, withdrawal, or refusal of reception conditions to be
taken individually, objectively, and impartially; moreover,
reasons must be given.112 It also stipulates that “decisions
shall be based on the particular situation of the person
concerned, especially with regard to [more vulnerable
groups] taking into account the principle of proportional-
ity.”113 Finally, the Directive provides that negative deci-
sions relating to benefits may be appealed according to the
procedures laid down in national law.114 These safeguards,
however, may not be sufficient to counter the detrimental
effects of likely stringent national interpretations.
The high degree of discretion enjoyed by the Member
States under the Reception Conditions Directive  is evi-
denced in the provision on asylum seekers’ access to em-
ployment. Indeed, it is for the Member States to decide “a
period of time, starting from the date on which the appli-
cation for asylum was lodged, during which an applicant
shall not have access to the labour market.”115 Where a
first-instance decision on the asylum claim has not been
taken within one year, “Member States shall decide the
conditions for granting access to the labour market,” pro-
vided that the applicant is not responsible for this delay.116
The Directive, therefore, extends to one year the six-month
period originally proposed by the Commission during
which asylum seekers may be denied access to employ-
ment.117 Access to employment shall not be removed dur-
ing appeals; this was a particularly contentious provision
during the Council negotiations.118 The Directive allows for
a certain degree of protectionism since Member States are
allowed to give priority for access to domestic labour mar-
kets to EU citizens, nationals of States parties to the Agree-
ment on the European Economic Area, and legally resident
third-country nationals.119 UNHCR felt that
the decision not to harmonize the very different national poli-
cies and practices regarding access to employment is a draw-
back, particularly at a time when many states are talking about
labour deficits and are also concerned about the costs of sup-
porting asylum seekers through a sometimes lengthy asylum
procedure. Not allowing asylum seekers—many of whom are
talented and skilled professionals—to work is not beneficial to
market economies.”120
Besides, the role that work can play in helping asylum
seekers to regain some sense of normality and dignity
should not be overlooked.121
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Because the vast majority of asylum seekers are destitute
upon arrival, material reception conditions must be pro-
vided “to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health
of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence.”122
Hence, the modalities of State support for asylum seekers
must be conducive to the creation of dignified living con-
ditions in host States. Agreement on the forms that support
could take proved problematic; as a result the Directive
gives great discretion to the Member States. Indeed, Article
13(5) reads that material reception conditions may “be
provided in kind, or in the form of financial allowances, or
vouchers or in combination of these provisions.”123 In its
Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission indicated
that this system was “flexible enough to allow Member
States to choose the way of providing material reception
conditions that are most suitable according to their internal
situation.”124 Voucher schemes were criticized for stigma-
tizing asylum seekers, exposing them to prejudice and dis-
crimination, and forcing them to live in a cashless
society.125 In the UK, vouchers were replaced by cash allow-
ances in April 2002 following claims that they stigmatized
asylum seekers, posed practical difficulties, and were un-
economical.126
With respect to housing, the Directive gives Member
States the choice between different types of accommoda-
tion, namely accommodation centres, private houses, flats,
hotels, or other premises.127 The Directive, however, re-
mains rather evasive on the question of standards and only
stipulates that accommodation centres must guarantee “an
adequate standard of living”128 and that other forms of
housing must be “adapted for housing applicants.”129 Irre-
spective of the elected type of accommodation, Member
States are under the obligation to protect asylum seekers’
right to family life as well as ensure communications with
relatives, UNHCR representatives, and NGOs.130 Notwith-
standing its positive aspects, the major weakness of the
Reception Conditions Directive with regard to accommo-
dation lies with its failure to establish clear standards de-
signed to ensure that asylum seekers are lodged in
conditions conducive to a “dignified standard of living,”
one of the stated aims of the Directive.131
Another determinant of “a dignified standard of living”
is access to health care. The Reception Conditions Directive
requires that health care be provided and include, as a
minimum, emergency and essential treatment.132 The
Commission’s Proposal was more comprehensive and pro-
vided for access to primary health care and psychological
care that could not be postponed.133
UNHCR indicated that these minimum standards should in-
clude counselling on reproductive health; confidentiality in
respect of medical and psychological counselling; psychological
counselling free of charge and training regarding sensitivity for
medical personnel dealing with patients of different cultural
backgrounds.134
One may regret the absence of more wide-ranging and
specific minimum standards designed to ensure the full
realization of the right to health care for asylum seekers.135
The Reception Conditions  Directive provides  for the
schooling and education of minor children of asylum seek-
ers as well as minors who are asylum seekers themselves.136
The Directive stipulates, inter alia, that education be pro-
vided in accommodation centres.137 UNHCR expressed
concern that this “segregation” would contribute to the
marginalization of these children. It recommended that
where such arrangements were in place, they should only
be for a limited period.138
While there are positive aspects to the Reception Condi-
tions Directive, the level of compromise required for its
adoption, which transpires in the degree of discretion
granted to the EU Member States, prevents the Directive
from reflecting best practice and establishing standards that
fully embrace international law.
The avoidance of conflict between the EU legal regime and the
international instances may well depend on how the [Euro-
pean] Court of Justice takes up its task in interpreting the
asylum measures [including the Reception Conditions Direc-
tive] in the context of the Member States international human
rights obligations.139
Conclusion
Restrictive asylum policies tend to use the threat of destitu-
tion as a deterrent against asylum seeking. Such practices rest
upon the simplistic and erroneous assumption that the level
of support in host States is a key factor in asylum seekers’
primary and secondary movement patterns. Furthermore,
sentencing asylum seekers to a destitute life undermines the
right to seek refugee status and goes against international
human rights standards.
Developments at EU level reveal stern and worrying
tensions between the EU Member States’ obligations under
international refugee and human rights law and the EU
objectives in the field of asylum. While commitment to
human rights and refugee protection is relentlessly reiter-
ated,  Member State  and EU policies and legislation on
asylum show a different picture. The drive towards reduc-
ing the numbers of asylum seekers in the EU has pushed the
question of human right into the background. This state of
affairs is made worse by the fact that asylum is increasingly
perceived as a migration and security-related matter; this
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contributes to the creation of a climate hostile to asylum
seekers.
The challenge for the enlarged EU is therefore to uphold
the right to seek refugee status and remain true to its role
and image as a human rights champion. To deny asylum
seekers dignified living conditions would amount to repu-
diating the European humanitarian tradition and condon-
ing breaches of international law within but also beyond the
territory of the EU. The challenges faced by the EU Member
States as host countries must not be overlooked; however,
they cannot be used to legitimize unduly austere laws and
to justify violations of international norms. The move to-
wards a common European asylum system provides the EU
with a critical opportunity to revisit its asylum policy with
a view to reconciling EU legislation with international refu-
gee and human rights law.
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